Image via the Washington International Trade Association
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Since the mid-twentieth century, the United States has not merely supported the vast worldwide economic integration brought on by globalization—it has actively spearheaded it.
After its emergence from World War II as the dominant global hegemon, the U.S. effectively led the post-war world into the liberal international order, founding the rules-based, democratic system of international governance still largely abided by today. In doing so, the nation championed economic liberalization at the global scale, prescribing the principles of free trade and open markets across the world.
America’s promotion of economic globalization, a cornerstone of its foreign policy for nearly a century, has now gone into retreat over the past decade. However, its replacement is no stranger to the nation’s foreign policy, but an even older tradition of it: protectionism.
In the U.S. today, protectionism has made an outstanding comeback. Even more shockingly, within the country’s current state of unprecedented political polarization, it is garnering bipartisan support.
Despite the stark division between Democrats and Republicans on most prominent issues facing the nation today, both parties have become increasingly opposed to the objectives of free trade and economic integration they once supported. Now, protectionist policies aimed at limiting foreign imports, protecting domestic labor and industry, and bolstering national security are on the rise with support from both sides of the spectrum.
Historically speaking, both Democrats and Republicans generally supported economic globalization from the mid-20th century until the 2000s. The two parties tended to diverge in their approaches to certain aspects of this policy, notably trade regulation, protection of domestic labor, free trade agreements (FTAs), and environmental standards. However, even with their occasional partisan discrepancies and alternative approaches, free trade and economic openness were consistently met with support from both the left and right.
In terms of post-WWII Republican approaches, the GOP’s staunch backing of economic globalization was rooted largely in its commitment to the core ideas of neoliberalism. They preached that the U.S. would undergo economic growth and increase its global influence through the liberalization of trade and the opening of markets, working to advance these objectives. The notion of free trade also coincided closely with traditional conservative values of limited government, responsible internationalism, and free market competition. Often branding itself as the “party of free trade,” the GOP’s support for this endeavor also stemmed largely from its ties to big business and multinational corporations, which profited from the U.S.’s role in the global economy.
The attitude among most Democrats during this period was typically more cautious than that of their right-leaning counterparts. The Democratic Party often put a greater emphasis on maintaining national security, protecting domestic labor and industry, and upholding environmental standards. That being said, it still recognized the importance of maintaining America’s hegemony and expanding its opportunities for growth and prosperity within global markets. As a result, Democrats of this era cooperated with Republicans to realize the nation’s economic objectives on the international stage.
Both the Republican and Democratic administrations that held office for the latter half of the 20th century advanced the United States’ role in the global economy. Under former United States Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, several crucial trade agreements and international economic institutions were entered—most notably, the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Essentially, this era in history reflects the bipartisan consensus that once backed globalization and the economic principles of liberal internationalism.
Following the turn of the century, however, a number of things began to change.
With drastic shifts in global power dynamics and fluctuations in domestic economic conditions, protectionist sentiment gradually crept back into U.S. foreign policy on both ends of the political spectrum.
Now, in 2024, it appears as though these outmoded policies of protectionism have made a full shift from the outskirts of American politics to the nation’s mainstream political consciousness.
Among the range of concerns across both parties in the United States today, China’s rise on the international stage has undoubtedly been one of the most influential in driving the nation’s regression to protectionism.
America’s overt adoption of protectionist trade policy with China essentially began with former President Donald Trump’s assumption of office. Throughout his term, Trump attributed a number of China’s unfair trade practices—intellectual property theft, currency manipulation, export subsidies, and economic espionage—to the drastic loss in domestic manufacturing jobs. As a result, he began the ongoing U.S.-China trade war, imposing tariffs with the primary aim of reducing the U.S.’s trade deficit with China and protecting its domestic labor. Said tariffs are now averaging approximately 18% on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of Chinese imports, including steel, aluminum, washing machines and solar panels. As he now campaigns for reelection to the U.S. presidency, Trump has maintained his commitment to imposing tariffs on Chinese imports by suggesting that he would triple these tariffs.
To the surprise of Americans everywhere, President Joe Biden not only kept the majority of the Trump Administration’s Chinese import tariffs in place after taking office, but continued to augment them throughout his term.
The Biden Administration has expanded upon Trump’s objectives to protect domestic industry, working to boost U.S. innovation and increase supply chain resilience. As president, Biden has also implemented and increased tariffs on other Chinese goods, notably semiconductors and electric vehicles. Now, with Biden nearing the end of his term, Democrats and Republicans alike have adopted a drastically tougher stance on China.
The other key factor behind the surge in protectionism within the United States has been economic globalization’s harmful consequences on domestic industries and labor.
Once again, this concern escalated in 2016 during the Trump Administration. Known for his “America First” rhetoric, Trump promoted restrictive trade policies in order to protect American jobs and workers from exposure to foreign competition. This was realized most prominently through Trump’s replacement of NAFTA. This agreement, negotiated by the Republican Bush administration in 1992 and signed into law two years later by the Democratic Clinton administration, long served as a cornerstone of American trade policy and reflected its bipartisan consensus. After referring to NAFTA as the “worst trade deal ever made,” Trump renegotiated it into the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). This revised agreement mainly created provisions to favor domestic production and enforce stricter labor laws. Trump’s broad objective of cracking down on trade also became apparent through his withdrawal from and revision of numerous other existing trade agreements. For instance, the day he entered office, he immediately withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—a twelve-nation free trade agreement negotiated by his Democratic predecessor, former President Barack Obama. Two years later, he also made amendments to the U.S.-Korea Trade Agreement (KORUS), establishing new quotas on Korean steel imports. These changes made to decades-long international negotiations and agreements catalyzed the Republican Party’s protectionist inclination in the name of domestic labor.
Just as Biden upheld many of Trump’s tariffs on Chinese goods after entering office, he likewise sought to continue the protection of American jobs. For example, the Biden administration has put a significant emphasis on reshoring manufacturing. This objective has been demonstrated largely through the CHIPS and Science Act. This act, which has provided billions of dollars to boost domestic semiconductor production, has aimed to foster innovation within the country and reduce its reliance on foreign supply chains. In addition to Biden, a number of noteworthy Democrats in Congress, such as Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders, have voiced their disapproval of free trade agreements and other aspects of trade liberalization that have devastated American industries.
Ultimately, understanding the factors driving the emergence of bipartisan-supported protectionist policy over the past decade requires considering the the greater context of globalization at large. The development of the U.S.-China competition within the global economy and the disintegration of domestic industries in the United States are essentially symptoms of globalization. Through this understanding, it perhaps makes us consider whether the recent rise in protectionism and its bipartisan support are a regression to antiquated traditions of U.S. foreign policy, or merely the result of unchecked globalization.
This bipartisan protectionist sentiment may have a silver lining, creating a common ground between the left and right amid today’s heightened political polarization. That being said, it more broadly reflects the growing concerns about the U.S.’s role in the rapidly evolving global economy. Does the U.S. need to abandon protectionism and find a better way to keep up?
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This article was edited by Molly Morrison.
